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To	 determine	 transmission	 potential	 of	 influenza	A(H7N9)	
virus,	we	used	symptom	onset	data	to	compare	2	waves	of	
infection in China during 2013–2014. We found evidence of 
increased transmission potential in the second wave and 
showed	that	live	bird	market	closure	was	significantly	less	
effective in Guangdong than in other regions.
From February 19, 2013, through April 22, 2014, a total of 429 cases of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection in 
humans in China were reported and occurred in 2 outbreak 
waves. During the first wave in spring 2013, live bird mar-
kets were closed in several parts of China (1,2); these mar-
ket closures substantially reduced the risk for infection in 
affected regions (3). During a second wave in autumn 2013 
(4), markets were again closed in some provinces (5–7). 
Analysis of the largest clusters of subtype H7N9 virus in-
fection in 2013 suggested that the basic reproduction num-
ber (R0, the average number of secondary cases generated 
by a typical infectious host in a fully susceptible popula-
tion) was higher in some clusters than in others (8,9), al-
though the absence of sustained transmission implied that 
R0 was less than the critical value of 1. To determine the 
transmission potential of influenza A(H7N9) virus in the 
first and second waves in 2013, we compared symptom on-
set data. We also measured the extent to which market clo-
sures in 2014 reduced spillover hazard (i.e., risk for animal-
to-human infection). 
The Study
We focused on the locations of the 6 largest outbreaks: 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu (first wave) and Guang-
dong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu (second wave). To infer mar-
ket hazard and human-to-human transmission potential, we 
used a statistical model of infection spillover (9). We as-
sumed that cases could be generated in 1 of 2 ways: on each 
day, the expected number of reported cases was equal to the 
sum of animal exposure and secondary cases generated by 
earlier infectious hosts (online Technical Appendix, http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/5/14-1137-Techapp1.pdf). 
Use of such a framework enables estimation of the degree 
of human-to-human transmission from symptom onset data 
and of exposure hazard from markets; the accuracy of these 
estimates is greatly improved when the timing of a sudden 
change in hazard, such as a market closure, is known (9). 
We therefore constrained the timing of the drop in exposure 
hazard to reported market closure dates (online Technical 
Appendix Table 1). We also estimated R0 for each of the 6 
outbreaks. For patients with known exposure, cluster reports 
suggest that the serial interval (time delay between symptom 
onset in primary and secondary case-patients) could be 7–8 
days (online Technical Appendix Table 2). We therefore as-
sumed a serial interval of 7 days for our main analysis and 
tested a range of values from 3 to 9 days during sensitivity 
analysis. We adjusted for potential delays between symptom 
onset and case report on the basis of the distribution of de-
lays to date (online Technical Appendix Figure 1).
During the first wave, cases were initially concentrated 
around Shanghai; reports centered on the city and neighbor-
ing Zhejiang and Jiangsu (Figure 1, panel A). A wave-like 
relationship between location and onset timing was appar-
ent; distance between the location of the first case-patient 
in Shanghai and subsequent case-patients increased over 
time (Figure 1, panel B). The pattern of cases at the start 
of the second wave suggests that infection did not spread 
outward from a single source; in October 2013, initial cases 
occurred in Guangdong and Zhejiang.
We used our statistical model to estimate the relative 
contributions of animal-to-human and human-to-human 
transmission. In Zhejiang, Shanghai, and Guangdong, mar-
ket hazard clearly increased and decreased at the start and 
end of the outbreak, respectively (Figure 2). We also esti-
mated R0 for different regions over the 2 outbreak waves 
(Table). Although our estimates for Jiangsu did not change 
significantly between the 2 waves, for Zhejiang, R0 was 
significantly higher for the second wave than for the first 
wave in spring 2013 (p = 0.045). We estimated R0 to be 
0.06 (95% credible interval [CrI] 0.00–0.25) in the first 
wave and 0.35 (95% CrI 0.15–0.65) in the second.
Using our estimates for R0 and market hazard, we esti-
mated the number of cases in each outbreak that resulted from 
human-to-human rather than animal-to-human transmission. 
We found evidence of a small but significant amount of 
transmission between humans in the first and second waves 
(Table). Our findings agree with reports of possible human 
clusters in the first wave (1,10–12) and corroborate media re-
ports of possible human clusters in Zhejiang and Guangdong 
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during 2013–2014. We identified 5 clusters during the first 
wave (February–April 2013) and 8 clusters during the sec-
ond wave (November 2013–May 2014); the clusters in both 
waves had median size of 2 cases per cluster (online Techni-
cal Appendix Table 2). These conclusions were robust under 
different assumptions about the duration of serial interval 
(online Technical Appendix Figures 2, 3).
During the second wave, market closures in Zhejiang 
began on January 22, 2014, and ended on January 26, 2014 
(Table). The reduction in spillover hazard after these clo-
sures was significant. We estimated that closures for a se-
rial interval of 7 days reduced hazard by 97% (95% CrI 
92%–99%). During 2013, estimated effectiveness was sim-
ilar in Zhejiang (99%; 95% CrI 97%–100%) and Shanghai 
(99%; 95% CrI 95%–100%). These estimates are in agree-
ment with those from other analyses for the first wave (3). 
The 95% CrI was broader for Jiangsu, however, where es-
timated effectiveness was 97% (95% CrI 80%–100%). In 
Guangdong, Guangzhou markets closed on February 16, 
2014, and reopened on February 28; markets in other cities 
in Guangdong closed around the same time for 2 weeks. 
Our results suggest that these closures reduced hazard by 
73% (95% CrI 53%–89%). This reduction was significant-
ly smaller than that for Shanghai and Zhejiang (p<0.01). 
Our result was robust at different serial intervals of infec-
tion (online Technical Appendix Figure 4).
Despite the effectiveness of closures during the first 
wave, interventions in most regions were delayed until 
after the Chinese New Year (January 31, 2014). Some 
regions are investigating alternative market practices: 
Guangzhou has implemented a trial of a permanent ban 
on live poultry sales in certain markets, potentially to 
extend over the entire city by 2024 (5). Our results sup-
port recommendations made after the first wave of out-
breaks in 2013 (3), which suggest that prompt closure of 
markets could lead to substantially fewer infections. 
However, our finding that the relative effectiveness of 
the shorter closure in Guangdong was lower suggests that 
such interventions are needed for a sufficiently long time 
to prevent recurrence.
Our study has limitations. First, case data were insuffi-
cient for us to jointly infer serial interval and transmissibil-
ity. We therefore tested our results against a wide range of 
plausible assumptions about the serial interval of infection 
(online Technical Appendix). We also assumed that the 
market hazard increased and decreased in a simple step-
wise manner (Figure 2). Local market density could also 
influence the size of spillover hazard and, hence, effective-
ness of interventions (13). If the market hazard could be 
better characterized (e.g., by longitudinal serologic surveil-
lance [14]), the accuracy of our estimates would probably 
be improved (9). When estimating R0, we did not incorpo-
rate individual-level variability in transmission and poten-
tial superspreading events. However, the framework that 
we used can still produce reliable estimates of R0 when a 
population contains superspreaders (9).
Figure 1. Spatial and temporal 
distribution of reported cases 
of	influenza	A(H7N9)	virus	
infection	among	humans,	
China,	2013–2014.	Onset	of	
the	first	case	in	wave	1	was	
February	19,	2013	(although	
the case was not reported 
until	the	end	of	March	2013);	
onset of the last case in wave 
1	was	July	27,	2013;	only	4	
cases	occurred	in	May–July	
2013.	Onset	of	the	first	case	in	
wave 2 was October 7; onset 
of the last case in our time 
series	was	April	17,	2014.	A)	
Case onset reports across all 
regions. Colors indicate the 4 
largest geographic clusters; 
black	indicates	all	other	cases.	
B)	Spatial	pattern	of	reported	
cases. Points show geodesic 
distance	between	the	first	
reported	case	of	influenza	
A(H7N9)	virus	infection	(in	
Shanghai) and location of each 
subsequent reported case. 
Cases are colored by region as 
in panel A.
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Conclusions
We found no evidence of reduced human-to-human trans-
mission between the 2 waves. For a serial interval of 7 days, 
we estimated that R0 increased in Zhejiang. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of live bird market closures varied between re-
gions; short-term closures were substantially less effective 
than interventions in other regions. These results emphasize 
the value of prompt and sustainable control measures during 
outbreaks of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection.
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Figure 2. A posteriori 
probability estimates of 
spillover	hazard	for	influenza	
A(H7N9)	virus	infection	in	
China,	by	region.	Black	
dots show total number of 
reported	influenza	A(H7N9)	
virus cases for which 
symptom onset occurred on 
a given date. Red shading 
shows a posteriori probability 
estimate of spillover hazard 
(i.e.,	the	expected	number	of	
cases resulting from animal-
to-human transmission on 
each day). A serial interval 
of 7 days was assumed. 
A)	Zhejiang,	2013–2014;	
B)	Jiangsu,	2013–2014;	
C)	Shanghai,	first	outbreak	
wave,	2013;	D)	Guangdong,	
second	outbreak	wave,	
2013–2014.
 
 
 
Table. Estimates of human-to-human transmission and effectiveness of live bird market closures, China,	2013–2014* 
Region,	outbreak	wave 
Total no. 
cases R0 (95%	CrI) 
Human-to-human	transmission,	 
no.	cases	(95%	CrI) 
Hazard	reduction,	%	
(95%	CrI) 
Shanghai,	first 29 0.32 (0.06–0.60) 11.0 (2.3–14.8) 99	(95–100) 
Jiangsu	     
 First  23 0.24 (0.03–0.69) 6.7 (2.0–12.2) 97	(80–100) 
 Second 26 0.13 (0.01–0.41) 2.9	(0.1–8.7) NC 
Zhejiang	     
 First 46 0.06 (0.00–0.25) 3.8 (0.8–12.4) 99	(97–100) 
 Second 92 0.35 (0.15–0.65) 32.5 (17.3–48.9) 97	(92–99) 
Guangdong,	second 103 0.16 (0.01–0.54) 16.7 (1.0–48.6) 73 (53–89) 
*A	serial	interval	of	7	days	was	assumed.	For	sensitivity	analysis,	see	online	Technical	Appendix	(http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/5/14-1137-
Techapp1.pdf).	CrI,	credible	interval;	NC,	not	calculated;	R0,	reproduction	number	(average	number	of	secondary cases generated by a typical infectious 
host in a fully susceptible population). 
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